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Abstract. This paper studies empirically whether mandatory unbundling delayed
the deployment of DSL service by BellSouth by exploiting a law change in Kentucky
and variation in access prices across markets. I ﬁnd that deregulation in Kentucky
triggered deployment, but I ﬁnd no evidence that access prices aﬀected deployment
pace. An upper bound on the welfare loss due to late deployment in rural markets
is $21 million. The ﬁndings are consistent with a positive eﬀect of deregulation on
the proﬁtability of upgrades, but can also result from a strategic delay which is part
of the bargaining between the ﬁrm and the regulator.
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1. Introduction
The provision of broadband Internet access over telephone lines re-
quired incumbent telephone companies to perform costly equipment
upgrades. Due to access regulation the telephone carriers could not
capture all the proﬁts that such upgrades would yield; the Telecom-
munication Act of 1996 imposes access rules, which force the upstream
telephone companies to lease all the elements of their local network and
charge regulated prices. The retailers which lease the lines compete
in the downstream market with the incumbent carriers. In the case
of broadband, independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs) compete
with the Bell companies in the provision of DSL service to consumers.
The access rules have two opposite eﬀects on consumer welfare which
are demonstrated in Figure 1. Once a telephone company upgrades the
network in a certain market, consumers in that market beneﬁt from
access rules that enhance competition between ISPs and therefore in-
crease consumer surplus. On the other hand, the expected competition
and regulated access prices may decrease the returns of the incumbent
from investment in network upgrades. As a result, the deployment of
∗ I would like to thank Tim Bresnahan, Liran Einav, Phillip Leslie, and Gregory
Rosston for beneﬁcial conversations. Special thanks to Roger Noll for helpful dis-
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Figure 1. The Economic Tradeoﬀ
the new service may be delayed in some markets, decreasing the surplus
of consumers.
As a ﬁrst step in quantifying this tradeoﬀ I examine how the access
rules aﬀected the timing of upgrades in BellSouth Central Oﬃces (COs)
using two approaches. First, I study how deregulation in Kentucky,
which released BellSouth from the requirement to provide access to
downstream retailers changed the frequency of upgrades. Estimating
a proportional hazard model allows me to separate between market
covariates and changes in deployment pace over time. I ﬁnd a large
positive eﬀect of deregulation on deployments rate. Second, I exploit
variation across markets in the diﬀerence between the regulated whole-
sale price and the cost of upgrade. I do not ﬁnd robust evidence that
this margin aﬀects deployment pace.
The increase in investment after deregulation is consistent with a
positive eﬀect of deregulation on the proﬁtability of upgrades, but
may also be a strategic response of the ﬁrm once its request from the
regulator is accommodated. Delaying upgrades in proﬁtable markets,
puts pressure on the regulator to revise the rules. Thus, the estimates
that I get are an upper bound on the eﬀect of deregulation on pace of
deployment. I use these estimates to calculate what would have been
the deployment time proﬁle without access regulation in rural areas.
I ﬁnd that regulation induced a welfare loss of at most $21 million to
BellSouth customers due to late deployment.
This analysis contributes to the empirical literature that examines
the eﬀects of the 1996 Telecommunication Act mandatory unbundling
requirement on the market of ordinary telephone service.1 Contrary to
the previous literature in this area which focuses on the eﬀects of the
rule on downstream retailers behavior, my paper investigates the eﬀect
1 Greenstein and Mazzeo (2005), Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004) and
Quast (2005a) study entry and investment decisions of Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs). Economides et al (2004) evaluate the eﬀect of CLECs’ entry on
consumer welfare.
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of the Telecommunication Act on the upstream incumbent decisions.
I also build on the work that studies the eﬀect of the access rules on
broadband deployment. In Appendix A I present the arguments that
are discussed in this mostly theoretical literature.2 The third moti-
vation is to approach empirically policies that trade oﬀ between ﬁrms’
investment incentives and the extent of competition in the market. This
question has been studied theoretically in contexts such as collusion in
industries with intensive innovation and patent rules. While the theory
is very rich, empirical work quantifying this tradeoﬀ is scant.
The next section describes the data and the empirical approach.
In section 3 I present the analysis of the law change in Kentucky, on
which the welfare analysis in section 4 is based. Section 5 examines
the relationship between wholesale prices and upgrades pace. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2. Data and Empirical Approach
The dataset combines three sources of information. The ﬁrst source is
the dates in which DSL service was available to consumers in each of
1603 BellSouth’s central oﬃces, which serve nine states. The data was
downloaded in June 2005 from BellSouth’s website.3 The day in which
the service was provided is the dependent variable in the estimated
equations. Figure 2 shows a clear pattern: the higher the number of
lines that a central oﬃce serves the earlier the deployment of DSL.
Since we are interested in the eﬀect of regulation on the timing of the
incumbent’s investment, ideally we would want to observe the date
of investment. Using the day in which the service was oﬀered as the
dependent variable is based on the assumption that it is a good proxy
for the time when the decision to invest was made.
The second source is information from an FCC report from 1999 that
includes the total number of lines that each central oﬃce serves. These
two sources were matched with the demographic characteristics of the
city or town from the US 2000 Census. The variables from the census
include educational attainment, income, age, as well as population and
density of homes. In addition to the three main sources, FCC orders
and BellSouth contracts with entrants were used to obtain information
about regulation rules, and wholesale prices.
2 The only paper that addresses this question empirically is Wallsten (2005). He
ﬁnds that most state policies that encourage broadband penetration are ineﬀective.
The unit of analysis in his study is a state.
3 By June 2005 1594 out of the 1603 central oﬃces were upgraded
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Figure 2. Cental oﬃce size and time of upgrade
The goal of the empirical analysis is to infer from the central oﬃce
upgrade dates how deregulation in Kentucky and diﬀerent access prices
across markets aﬀected BellSouth behavior. A hazard model is a re-
duced form description of the solution to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization
problem. In the underlying model, the optimal day t for deployment




π (Xi,t) = max
t
R(Xi,t,θ) − C (1)
where Xi are demand characteristics of market i, R is the present
value of revenue and C is the ﬁxed cost of upgrade, which is as-
sumed to be constant across markets and over time. We expect demand
characteristics to aﬀect the deployment dates in the following ways.
First, assuming that consumers willingness to pay for broadband access
increases over time, a large market will become proﬁtable before a
market which has fewer consumers. Second, if the ﬁrm faces capacity
constraints in terms of number of upgrades per time period, the proﬁt
maximizing strategy may be to sequence investments by market on the
basis of expected revenue.
A hazard model is a suitable framework for quantifying the eﬀect
of the law change in Kentucky on the pace of deployments. A simple
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regression, in which the upgrade time is the dependent variable, cannot
separate between variation across markets and a time trend. A pro-
portional hazard model estimates the eﬀect of market characteristics
as well as time trend on the probability of upgrade in each central
oﬃce. The time trend, also called baseline hazard, reﬂects changes in
deployment pace over time which cannot be explained by market covari-
ates.4 By comparing the baseline hazard in the periods before and after
the law change, I investigate in Section 3 the impact of deregulation
in Kentucky on the pace of upgrades. I use the baseline hazard in
the period after the change to perform the counterfactual and welfare
analysis in Section 4.
3. Kentucky Law Change
In April 2004, the Kentucky General Assembly voted to deregulate
broadband. The goal of this decision was to accelerate broadband roll-
out in the state’s rural areas. Because of its relatively low population
density, broadband deployment in Kentucky was considerably slower
than other states. In 2005, 25 percent of homes and small business
did not have access to broadband service compared to less than 5
percent in the rest of the country. The 2004 decision provides us with
an opportunity to examine how exempting BellSouth from following
the access rules changed its deployment behavior.
The law change in April 2004 was followed by a surge in upgrades.
Between August 2004 to December 2004 BellSouth upgraded 53 cen-
tral oﬃces in Kentucky and completed the rollout in the 179 COs of
the state. The following facts suggest that the upgrades were a direct
response to the law change. First, a year after the deregulation, Ellen
Jones, the regional director for BellSouth, said the following about
the law change in Kentucky: ”BellSouth was reluctant to invest more
money in broadband equipment in Kentucky when the state could try
to control prices or require BellSouth to sell DSL service to competitors
at discount prices... We would have expanded anyway, but it would have
been at a much slower rate.”5 Second, the breaks in installations that
we see in Figure 3 suggest that the reason that these COs were not
upgraded earlier is not a constraint on the number of installations that
the ﬁrm can perform each month.
4 Market covariate coeﬃcients are identiﬁed from the sequence os upgrades,
without using information about the actual dates. This allows a non parametric
estimation of the baseline hazard. See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of
the hazard model assumptions.
5 From ”Broadband bound,” The Courier Journal, September 25, 2005.
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Figure 3. Histogram of Deployment in Kentucky
I separate between the eﬀect of deregulation and market charac-
teristics on deployment behavior using a three-step procedure. First a
proportional hazard model is estimated, and the baseline hazard is cal-
culated. Second the baseline hazard is smoothed with a Epanechinikov
kernel. Third, the hazard is regressed on a constant and a dummy
variable for the post law change period. The regression results, in Table
I suggest that deregulation doubled the hazard rate. In Section 4 I use
this result to perform welfare analysis.
Two factors may bias the estimated eﬀect: anticipation of the legis-
lation and strategic delay. If BellSouth predicted the change, it would
have also accounted for it in the deployment decisions before April 2004.
If it was the case that there was partial or full anticipation, the eﬀect
that we measure will be biased toward zero, since the expectations
about future revenue were already internalized by BellSouth before
the rule passed. A second source for bias is strategic delay. The naive
interpretation for the break in upgrades between November 2003 and
August 2004 is that these markets were not proﬁtable under the old
regime. Once the new law passed BellSouth started deploying the new
technology in the COs that became proﬁtable under the new regime.
However, if we think about the interaction between BellSouth and the
regulator as a regulatory bargaining, it may be in BellSouth interest
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Table I. OLS Regression




not to upgrade proﬁtable markets, in order to increase the pressure
on the regulator to revise the rules. If these tactics were operating, it
would bias the measured eﬀect upward, as some of the installations after
the legislation would have been taken place even without a regulatory
change.
When considering these two sources for bias, strategic delay seems
more dominant. First, the long break in installations is more consistent
with a story in which BellSouth halts upgrades to put pressure on the
regulator to change the rules. Also, there is an explicit evidence that
the issue was negotiated between BellSouth and the state.6 Following
these arguments I interpret the measured eﬀect as an upper bound on
the actual impact of the law change.
4. Welfare Analysis
Given an estimation of the eﬀect of deregulation on the frequency of
upgrades we now turn to calculating bounds on the welfare loss due
to late deployment. This exercise takes the shift in the baseline hazard
as a reduced form representation of the increase in BellSouth expected
proﬁt as a result of the law change. Given the new regulatory regime,
the ﬁrm updates its deployment strategy, and accelerates upgrades.
By calculating the ﬁtted value of the median deployment date in each
market using both, pre- and post- law change baseline hazards, we
ﬁnd the predicted delay in each market due to regulation. As Figure 4
demonstrates, we can calculate an upper bound on welfare loss by mul-
tiplying the predicted delay with an estimate of the average consumer
surplus from DSL line per unit of time.
When applying the welfare analysis to other markets which are
served by BellSouth we have to consider to what extent they are similar
6 ”...[BellSouth] had promised it would speed up its DSL expansion if freed from
government dictates.” From ”Broadband bound,” The Courier Journal, September
25, 2005.
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Figure 4. Welfare loss
to the markets in Kentucky which were aﬀected by the law change.
Deregulation was enacted after sixty nine percent of Kentucky cus-
tomers had access to DSL, and it aﬀected deployment in rural areas.
Using the measured eﬀect for counterfactuals in urban markets is justi-
ﬁed only if we expect regulation to have the same eﬀect on deployment
pace in urban and rural areas. To account for the variation in costs and
demand across markets, all COs in BellSouth territory were divided
into four quartiles according to the total number of lines they serve.
As ﬁgure 2 and the regression in section 5 demonstrate, number of
lines is a very signiﬁcant variable when predicting upgrade time and
frequency. The ﬁrst quartile includes COs with up to 3375 lines. These
mostly rural markets are similar to the markets which were upgraded
in Kentucky after the law change. The COs in the other quartiles are
typically located in suburban and urban areas.
Welfare analysis requires information about the distribution of con-
sumers’ willingness to pay and retail price. Since the available data
does not allow us to estimate the demand function, we use results from
Goolsbee (2002) for assessing the surplus consumers derive from DSL
service.7 Goolsbee ﬁnds that under monopoly pricing, the average sur-
plus of consumers who buy the service in San Francisco is $48 a month.
When incorporating this result in our calculation we have to consider
the following factors. First, since 1998, when the survey was carried
out, both the level and the distribution of the willingness to pay for
broadband has been changed. In addition, San Francisco consumers are
more wealthy and considered more technology savvy than consumers in
the rest of the country (the median household income in San Francisco
7 Goolsbee’s paper estimates demand using survey data from Forrester’s Techno-
graphics 1999 program, and compares between two approaches for subsidizing
broadband: subsidizing usage and subsidizing investment.
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Table II. Bounds on Welfare Loss
Central Oﬃce Quartile Total Upper Bound on
(ranked by num of lines) Lines Welfare loss
Q1 up to 3375 21,200,000
Q2 3376 - 9429 33,822,222
Q3 9430 - 30624 71,022,222
Q4 more than 30624 153,333,333
is 55,221 compared with 32,000-42,000 in the states in BellSouth ter-
ritory). The last concern is that while in Goolsbee’s analysis the retail
price is set by a monopoly, in many markets DSL service competes with
broadband over Cables, so we expect lower prices.8 Since these factros
aﬀect the $48 estimation in opposite directions, and I cannot quantify
the ”net” bias, I will use the Goolsbee estimate as the average surplus
of consumers in the welfare calculations.
The results for each quartile, are reported in Table II. They are
based on calculating the consumer surplus loss Wi in each market:
Wi = Delayi ∗ Linesi ∗ 0.05 ∗ $48 (2)
where Delayi is the predicted adoption delay. It equals the diﬀerence
between the ﬁtted value of deployment under regulation and deregu-
lation. Linesi is the number of phone lines in central oﬃce i and 5%
is the proportion of telephone lines that provide DSL.9 The conserva-
tive calculation, which applies deregulation only on the rural markets,
suggests that access regulation induced a consumer surplus loss of $21
million due to late deployment. If we replicate the eﬀect for the entire
BellSouth market, the total loss is $279 million.
5. Variation in Regulated Access Prices
Next, I explore the variation in the margin between regulated wholesale
prices and upgrade cost to further study the relationship between access
regulation and deployment pace. According to the Telecommunication
Act of 1996 the Public Utility Commission (PUC) of each state ﬁxes the
access prices that incumbents can charge for leasing network elements
8 As a reference, in a duopoly market with linear demand curves and Cournot
competition consumer surplus is 16/9 times bigger, than in the monopoly case.
9 This number is based on information from BellSouth Quarterly earning reports.
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Figure 5. Qualitative Description of Wholesale Prices and Upgrade Costs
to retailers. Since the prices are set independently by each PUC they
vary across the nine states that BellSouth serves. Moreover, each PUC
classiﬁes each central oﬃces in its state as urban, suburban or rural.
For each one of the three zones the PUC sets a diﬀerent price that
reﬂects the fact that installation and maintenance costs increase when
population density decreases.10
We expect that conditional on demand characteristics, the diﬀerence
between wholesale price and the cost of upgrade is positively correlated
with early deployment. Everything else equal, BellSouth would prefer to
upgrade ﬁrst markets for which this margin is bigger. It is less likely to
face competition in these markets as the costs of operation for potential
entrants are higher. Even if competitors enter, the revenue from leasing
the lines is higher. To test this prediction we need variation in the mar-
gin between wholesale prices and costs. While ideally wholesale prices
perfectly reﬂect the incumbent’s costs, in practice there are gaps due
to two factors. First, dividing each state to three zones does not allow
perfect pricing as demonstrated in Figure 5. In this case for example,
we expect BellSouth to upgrade market B before market A. While in
terms of cost they are very similar, the wholesale price in market B is
signiﬁcantly higher, and consequently BellSouth faces less competition
in the retail market.
The second source for discrepancies between costs and wholesale
prices is political power. Quast (2005b) and Rosston et al (2005) ﬁnd
that political aﬃliation of the governor and state regulators may aﬀect
10 For example, the wholesale price per month of a “2 wire DSL compatible line”
in zones 1, 2 and 3 in Florida in 2001 were $11.52, $15.96 and $30.19, respectively.
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wholesale rates. Therefore, there may be variation in prices across states
that reﬂect other factors besides costs.11
I exploit these two sources of variation by estimating a hazard model
of upgrades with wholesale price as a regressor in addition to demand
and cost variables. I use access prices as listed in is the agreement that
BellSouth and Covad, the largest independent broadband retailer in the
US, signed in October 2001. Prices for earlier periods are not available,
therefore the model is estimated with the full sample and also with a
sub sample that includes only upgrades that took place after October
2001. Each sample is estimated with and without state ﬁxed eﬀects.12
The coeﬃcients, reported in Table III, represent the eﬀect of each
variable on the hazard ratio. Variables with a coeﬃcient which is larger
than one have a positive eﬀect on the pace of upgrades. Under the
hazard model assumptions, a change in the value of a variable aﬀects
the probability distribution of the upgrade day (as opposed to changing
only the mean in standard regression). In order to give the coeﬃcients a
duration interpretation it is useful to use the fact that for Exponential
hazard model with hazard ratio λ the median duration (in days) is
M = ln2/λ.
The regression controls for cost by using the City houses density
variable and for demand by including income, age and market size
variables. As we would expect, the results indicate that a higher me-
dian income is associated with an increase in the upgrade hazard. The
percentage of families in poverty also has a positive eﬀect on the hazard,
which is the opposite of the expected, perhaps resulting from the high
proportion of poor people in urbanized areas. The estimates of the age
coeﬃcients results are intuitive. They suggest that a high proportion
of people age 25-44 is associated with high hazard rate. The coeﬃcient
of log the number of lines is the most signiﬁcant with a strong positive
eﬀect on the hazard rate. The number of lines is also included in order
to allow a more ﬂexible eﬀect. It has a negative eﬀect on the hazard
rate, but the total eﬀect of number of lines is positive and signiﬁcant.
The number of lines is the best proxy in the data for market size.13
11 Prices may be endogenous if the regulators in states, in which deployment is slow
because of factors that we do not observe, try to encourage upgrades by increasing
prices. Due to this concern the preferred speciﬁcation includes state ﬁxed eﬀects.
12 The matching between the COs and demographics is based on city or town
name. This process is sensitive to the spelling of the names, thus 1159 observation
were matched.
13 Other papers that study empirically broadband availability ﬁnd similar results.
Augereau and Greenstein (2001) and Gabel and Kwan (2002) report that high-speed
access to the Internet is more likely to be available in urbanized area. Prieger (2003)
ﬁnds that in rural areas the availability is lower, and education increases availability.
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Table III. Proportional Hazard Model with Access Price
Dependent variable: Deployment Day
Full Sample 1113 Obs. Sub Sample 268 Obs.
1 2 3 4
Haz. Haz. Haz. Haz.
Ratio z Ratio z Ratio z Ratio z
City population* 1.0028 9.78 1.0025 9.58 0.9676 -2.48 0.9631 -2.88
City houses density* 1.4424 7.31 1.2571 4.89 1.2696 0.85 0.8667 -0.51
Income median hh* 1.0392 5.74 1.0348 5.16 1.0182 0.93 1.022 1.17
Per. families in poverty 1.0141 1.83 1.0177 2.35 1.0156 1.11 1.0231 1.71
Per. age under 18 1.0107 0.92 1.0217 1.93 1.0131 0.58 1.0192 0.9
Per. age 18-24 0.9522 -4.08 0.9459 -4.72 1.005 0.13 1.0065 0.18
Per. age 25-44 1.04 3.91 1.0532 5.37 1.0434 1.99 1.0225 1.05
Per. age 45-64 1.0342 2.01 1.0357 2.14 1.0489 1.44 1.0217 0.67
Per. less 9 years educ 0.9928 -0.96 1.0005 0.07 0.9918 -0.7 0.9982 -0.16
Per. educ. bachelor 0.9931 -1.13 0.9963 -0.62 1.0046 0.26 1.0174 1
Total lines* 0.9882 -4.77 0.9874 -5.27 0.9751 -2.4 0.9809 -1.78
ln(Total lines) 3.2999 18.55 3.056 18.02 2.8588 7.81 2.3917 7.34
Access price 1.0189 2.44 0.9931 -1.23 1.1063 4.43 1.0196 1.79
AL 1.1218 0.89 1.234 0.79
FL 0.5219 -4.67 0.8024 -0.59
GA 1.1511 1.12 3.7555 4.64
KY 0.938 -0.5 0.4032 -3.68
LA 1.361 2.27 2.0371 2.28
NC 1.5339 3.18 7.8058 3.84
SC 0.8689 -0.99 0.4516 -2.4
* In thousands
The preferred speciﬁcation is the one with the full sample and state
ﬁxed eﬀects and is reported in column 1 of Table III. The estimation
with the sub sample yields coeﬃcients with a sign which is opposite
of what we would expect for the City population variable. Also the
coeﬃcients of the income variable are not signiﬁcant, while in the full
sample they are strongly signiﬁcant. It may be the case that the sub
sample, which includes installations from the late period of deployment,
suﬀers from selection bias and therefore I choose to rely on the full
sample. The full sample estimation with state ﬁxed eﬀects is preferred
over the one without them (Column 2) since states policies may be
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correlated with unobserved variables. Without ﬁxed eﬀects, the access
price coeﬃcient may be biased downward, since PUCs in states where
the deployment is slow may encourage it by increasing access prices in
order to make investment more proﬁtable for BellSouth.
The coeﬃcient of interest is Access price. In Column 1 wholesale
prices have a positive eﬀect on the upgrade hazard. This implies that
within a state, everything else equal, higher access prices induce earlier
deployment. An increase of $1 in the access price makes the deployment
hazard 1.0189 times bigger. This means for example that three years
after the rollout starts, the probability to remain without the new
technology decreases by about 5 percent. The coeﬃcient of access price
in the speciﬁcation without state ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2) is negative,
which implies a negative eﬀect on the hazard rate.
The results in this subsection provide some evidence that BellSouth
deployed DSL faster in markets in which the regulated access price were
higher. However, the eﬀect is small in magnitude and is not robust.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the eﬀect of mandatory unbundling on the
deployment of DSL technology by BellSouth. The analysis ﬁnds clear
evidence of a positive eﬀect of deregulation on deployment pace in
rural areas. Counterfactual calculation suggests that if the DSL market
were deregulated, the surplus of BellSouth consumers in rural areas
would have increased by $21 million. The ﬁndings are consistent with
a positive eﬀect of deregulation on BellSouth proﬁtability, but can also
result from a strategic delay which is part of a bargaining between the
ﬁrm and the regulator.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the outcomes
of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 by focusing on its eﬀect on
incumbent strategies. Also, while many scholars have examined the
adverse eﬀect of mandatory unbundling on deployment from a theoret-
ical perspective, this is the ﬁrst empirical study which investigates the
eﬀect of access regulation on the incumbents investment in broadband
technology.
In addition, the paper builds on the economic literature, which stud-
ies the trade-oﬀ between ﬁrms’ investment and competition. The results
suggest that policies that encourage competition in the market may be
costly as they may aﬀect ﬁrms’ investment strategies. Thus, policy
makers when setting such rules should balance carefully between the
increase in consumer surplus due to competition and the decrease in
surplus caused by delayed investment.
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Appendix
A. Theoretical Background
Two theoretical regulatory questions are in the background of the
analysis. The ﬁrst, which is not investigated empirically in this paper,
is under what circumstances in terms of technology, costs, demand
and contract availability and enforcement, should access regulation be
imposed? Communication services can be provided by either a fully
integrated network, or by independent suppliers which provide service
in the network diﬀerent layers. Access regulation separates the layers
and allows multiple providers to participate in the vertical chain under
terms which are subject to the regulator’s control. Noll (1995, 2002)
discuss the beneﬁts from integration, such as better eﬃciency through
economies of scale and scope, and its costs; for example, exploiting the
integration to extend monopoly power into vertical related markets.
The second theoretical issue is how the regulator should set the
wholesale prices, so that the incumbent investment incentives are not
distorted? The FCC implementation of the Telecommunication Act sets
wholesale prices according to the Total Element Long Run Incremen-
tal Costs (TELRIC) scheme. This framework sets the rental rate for
each network element equal to the incremental cost of creating and
supplying that leased element if the network owner were designing and
constructing a completely new, optimally conﬁgured network. Pindyck
(2005) argues that this approach under-compensates the incumbents
because it does not account for the risk that the incumbent bears.
According to Pindyck, while the sunk cost of a telephone company
is lost if there is no demand for the new service, an entrant gets the
option to stay outside if market conditions are bad or to enter if they are
favorable. The TELERIC price does not include the value of this option.
Thus, Pindyck argues, TELRIC under-compensates the incumbent, and
consequently decreases its capital investment. Other analysts believe
that this potential under-reimbursement is oﬀset by a corresponding
increase in the allowed cost of capital; for higher risk levels the rental
rate that the regulator sets is higher. To the extent that BellSouth’s
upgrades decisions are based on the proﬁtability of each market (as
opposed to a strategic considerations) evidence of a negative eﬀect of
regulation on deployment is consistent with Pindyck’s argument.
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B. Hazard Model Assumptions
A hazard model allows estimating both the eﬀect of the demand co-
variates and a time trend. Denoting the cumulative probability that
DSL is oﬀered at time t in market i by Fi (t) and the density function
as fi (t), the hazard function λi (t) is deﬁned as the probability that
service will be oﬀered at time t given that is was not oﬀered before:
λi (t) = fi (t)/(1 − Fi (t)). The hazard function is speciﬁed with a
proportional hazard form: λi (t) = λ0 (t)exp(Xiβ). The proportional
hazard model is not based on any assumptions concerning the shape
of the underlying survival distribution. By estimating the covariates
eﬀect with Cox’s partial likelihood estimator we can derive the non
parametric baseline hazard. The covariates coeﬃcients β are identiﬁed
only by the order in which COs with diﬀerent characteristics are up-
graded, without using information about the actual dates. This allows
non parametric estimation of the baseline hazard.
This approach requires a few assumptions. First, it makes the pro-
portionality assumption, which means that the ratio of the hazard func-
tion for any two observations does not depend on time. In the context
of the underlying model discussed above, this means that the rela-
tive proﬁtability of two markets is constant over time. In other words,
changes in the level of demand over time are equal across markets.
Another limitation is the use of a single value for the covariates in
all periods. This implies that the demand variables from the US 2000
Census are a good proxy for the expected revenue during the deploy-
ment period 1998-2005. As long as there are no systematic changes
in demographic variables over time this assumption holds. The last
assumption is that censoring is independent of upgrade hazard. It im-
plies that central oﬃces in which DSL was not deployed have the same
upgrade distribution as non-censored observations.
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